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• 
• 
By letter of 25 July 1980 the President of the Council of the European 
communities requested the European Parliament to deliver an opinion on 
the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the 
council for a directive amending directive 72/464/EEC on taxes other 
than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco. 
On 25 August 1980 this proposal was referred to the Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs as the committee responsible and to the Committee on 
Budgets and the Committee on Agriculture for their opinion. 
On 23 September 1980 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr Beumer rapporteur. 
It considered this proposal from the Commission at its meetings of 
28 October 1980, 25 November 1980, 20 January and 30 January 1981 
and at this last meeting adopted the motion for a resolution and the 
explanatory statement by 8 votes to 1 with 6 abstentions. 
Present: ~ Delors, chairman; Mr Deleau, vice-chairman; 
Mr Beumer, rapporteur; Mrs Baduel Glorioso (deputizing for Mr Piquet), 
Mr Beazley, Mr Bonaccini, Mr Caborn, Miss Forster, Mr Herman, Mr Lange 
(deputizing for Mr Walter), Mr Leonardi, Mr Markozanis, Mr Purvis 
(deputizing for Mr Hopper), Mr Seal (deputizing for Mr Rogers) and 
Mr von Wogau. 
The opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Agriculture 
are attached. 
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A 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following .motion for a resoll1tion together \,•it.h 
explanatory statement; 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from 
the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a directive 
amending Directive 72/464/EEC on taxes other than turnover taxes which 
affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the proposa~ from the Commission to the council1 
- having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Articles 99 and 100 of 
the EEC Treaty (Doc. 1-328/80), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee 
on Agriculture (Doc. 1-871/BO), 
1. Notes that there is still relatively little overall interpenetration 
of the national tobacco markets and still a considerable difference 
in prices; 
2. Deplores the slow rate of progress on harmonization of exise duty, 
in particular on cigarettes; recalls the objectives set by the 
Council in 19702 according to which the final stage of harmonization 
was to have begun at the start of 1980; 
3. Notes that the proposed third stage of harmonization of excise duty 
on cigarettes~ still far short of the final stage and that the 
Commission judges that it could prove premature to lay down the 
details of this final stage at the present time; 
4. Points out that it is important for industry to have definite infor-
mation about the final stage of harmonization as otherwise medium and 
long-term planning is made unnecessarily difficult; believes that the 
indication by the Commission of what form this final stage could take, 
without however·making a proposal to the Council on this point, does 
nothing to dispel this uncertainty; 
1 OJ No. C 264, 11.10.1980, p. 6 
2 OJ No. C SO, 28.4.1970 
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5. Emphasizes that the taxation structure to emerge from harmonization 
must also be as neutral as possible from the point of view of competi-
tion; wonders, however, whether the method of harmonization laid down by 
the council in Directive 72/464/EEC, whose ultimate goal is to establish 
a fixed relationship between the specific and proportional components of 
the duty, is the best way of achieving this goal: 
6. Requests the Commission therefore to investigate as soon as possible, 
whether as regards the final stage it would not be more neutral from 
the point of view of competition to determine the effect of proportional 
taxation on retail prices than to fix the relationship between the 
specific and proportional components of duty: 
7. Disagrees with the proposals for a third stage of harmonization and 
urges a prolongation of the second stage pending the submission at 
the earliest possible date of final proposals that take into account 
all aspects of this harmonization issue, including the rules governing 
collection of excise duty; 
8. Considers that the proposal for reducing the minimum excise duty is 
premature; 
9. Notes that, according to the commission, use has not yet been made of 
the possibility of excluding customs duties from the basis of assessment 
of ad valorem excise duty on cigarettes so that removal of this option 
can have no major repercussions; agrees· therefore with the proposal that 
inclusion of customs duties in the basis of assessment of excise duty 
on cigarettes should be obligatory: 
10. Points out that the calculation of the financial implications for the 
EEC budget is incomplete and based on static hypotheses; 
11. Asks the Commission to submit as soon as possible the proposal on the 
harmonization of the rules governing collection of the excise duty 
referred to in Article 2 of its proposal which is to be adopted by the 
council before 31 December 1983. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. The structures of the national markets for tobacco products differ 
widely. Efforts to create a common market for tobacco products have in-
evitably come up against the divergent excise systems in the Member States. 
Partly as a result of high rates, these excise systems have a considerable 
influence on the pattern of consumption and their divergence makes them an 
obstacle to the realization of the conunon market. It was for this reason 
that in 1967 the Commission submitted a proposal for the harmonization of 
1 
excise duties on manufactured tobacco • 
2. Taking this proposal as a basis, Parliament held an exhaustive debate 
on the principles of the harmonization of excise duties on manufactured 
tobacco2 • It is not the purpose of this report to examine these principles 
in depth once again, since the proposal under discussion is concerned with 
the third stage of harmonization, harmonization having begun on 1 July 1973. 
As this third stage is due to begin on 1 January 1981, little time remains 
for the adoption of the proposal for a directive. At the same time, it should 
be noted that Article 1(3) of the first council directive of 19 December 19723 
stated that: 'On the basis of Articles 99 and 100 of the Treaty, the council 
shall, at least one year before the expiry of the period provided for in 
Article 7(1), adopt a directive laying down the special criteria applicable 
during the following stage or stages'. This was valid for the transition 
from the first to the second stage. As regards transition to the third stage, 
the period was limited to six months. 
It is therefore somewhat surprising that the Conunission has submitted 
this proposal for a third stage barely six months before the end of the 
present second stage. .By that time, the Council should in fact have already 
acknowledged the imminence of the third stage. The consequence of this is that the 
proposal will have to be dealt with in great haste if the third stage of" harmonization is 
in fact to begin on 1 January 1981 and the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs accordingly takes exception to the Commission's tardy submission of 
its proposal. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs nevertheless attaches 
great importance to the fact that progress should be made with harmonization 
and would be very sorry if it proved impossible to introduce the third stage 
of harmonization on l January 1981. It will therefore do its utmost to deal 
with this proposal for a directive as quickly as possible. 
1 Doc. 122/6 7-II 
2 Doc. 224/69 of 10 March 1969 
3 OJ No. L 303, 31.12.1972 
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L The rr·ain factor in the harmonization of excise duties on m21.nufactured 
tobacco is the duty on cigarettes since this is tha lar<Jcst source of rc\'cnt.,'. 
Work on harmonization has so far therefore con ... ·C'ntrat.:-d m~1inly C'n ciq;:JrC'tt<'>~. 
As far as other manufactured tobacco is concerned, harmoniz<ttion hd8 bct:!n linnted 
to a common definition of the various groups of products1• The present proposal 
is again concerned with cigarettes and particularly with the third stage of 
harmonization of excise duties on cigarettes. 
4. Before a start was made on harmonization, it was possible to divide the 
Member States into two groups: on the one hand, the Member States in which 
excise duty was almost exclusively levied in the form of a fixed amount per 
cigarette (the specific component) and, on the other hand, the Member States 
in which excise duty was principally a percentage of the retail price (the pro--
portional or ad valorem component). The accession of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland added a third system based on the weight of the raw tobacco, which,after 
a transitional period, has since been abolished. 
? 5. In its resolution of 21 April 1970~ the Council set itself the aim of 
harmonizing excise duty on cigarettes in these terms: 
'With regard to excise duty on cigarettes, a proportional element will be 
comb~ned with a specific element so that at the final stage, beginning on 
1 January 1980, the relationship between the proportional component and the 
specific component should be established to ensure that the range of retail 
prices freely fixed by manufacturers fairly reflects the difference in the 
manufacturers' supply prices'. 
6. This principle was reaffirmed in the first Council directive of 
19 December 19723 which laid down general principles for the harmonization of 
taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured 
tobacco and also initiated the first stage of harmonization. 
7. Without wishing to go into further detail about these general principles, 
one ought nevertheless to recall the conditions and principles with which the 
harmonized excise duty system must comply and to which attention has repeatedly 
been drawn by Parliament4 
the tax system must be neutral in its effects on competition: 
- the tax system must promote market interpenetration: 
1 Council Directive 79/32/EEC in OJ No. L 10, 16.1.1979 
2 OJ No. C 50, 28.4.1970 
3 OJ No. L 303, 31.12.1972 
4 Doc. 224/68 and Doc. 128/76 
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- the tax system must allow optimum ultilization of the tax source; 
the tax system must not lead to a narrowing of the price range, but 
quality must be maintained and product diversity promoted. 
8. How much progress has now been made with the harmonization of excise 
duties on cigarettes which began with the abovementioned first Council 
directive of 18 December 1972? As stated above this first directive laid 
down the provisions for the first stage of harmonization. 
The first stage of harmonization was originally planned to run for two 
years from 1 July 1973. During this period the specific component of the 
excise was to be situated between 5 and 75% of the aggregate amount of the 
proportional and specific components of the duty. 
9. This first stage of harmonization, which was to have lasted for two 
years, was later prolonged on four occasions and in fact ran on until 
30 June 1978 instead of 30 June 1975, i. c. exactl)' twice as long as originally 
intended. The second stage or: harmoni;·.ation was introduced on l July 19781• 
During this second stage of harmonization, the ratio between the specific 
excise duty component and the total tax charged (including VAT) must lie 
between 5 and 55%. By contrast with the first directive, the specific component 
is now set in relation to the total amount of taxation including VAT. 
10. The present proposal is for a third stage of harmonization to run from 
l January 1981 to 31 December 1986 and providing for a gradual narrowing of 
the band within which the specific component must lie in relation to the total 
tax burden: 
-from 1.1.1981 to 31.12.1982 within the existing bracket of 5-55%; 
-from 1.1.1983 to 31.12.1984 within the bracket 7.5-42.5%; 
-from 1.1.1985 to 31.12.1986 within the bracket 10-35%. 
11. In view of the aim set in the Council resolution of 1970 to reach the 
final stage on 1 January 1980, this proposal for a directive immediately 
prompts the comment that, even though this deadline has been passed, the 
objective remains a long way off. Although the target date was put back by 
one year in the second directive, it was still envisaged at that time that 
the final stage would follow on from the second stage. This final stage 
has no\'1 been replaced by a third stage of harmonization which will require 
another five years and only after that might the final phase be introduced. 
1 Council directive of 19 December 1977 in OJ No. L 338, 28.12.1977 
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A number of comments in the Commission's explanatory memorandum indicate 
how remote the final stage still is and how little of the original objective 
has been accomplished. It says: 'Notwithstanding the first two stages, price 
ranges still differ considerably, and the degree of market interpenetration 
overall is not great. Even if the final objective were fixed now, experience 
with the first two stages has shown that a lengthy period of adaptation will 
be required before that objective can be attained'. 
Does this mean that, after the third stage of harmonization, a fourth 
stage will be needed before the final stage can be attained? 
12. At all events, the Commission states that: 'To fix the final objective 
definitively at this stage could prove to be premature', and this despite 
Parliament's appeal, when commenting on the Commission's proposal for the 
second stage of harmonization, for 'strenuous efforts to find a solution for 
the final stage of harmonization'. The explanatory statement of Parliament's 
report (Doc. 128/76) said that it was no longer possible to avoid taking a 
decision in favour of one particular structure of excise duty on cigarettes 
after the expiry of the second stage since: 'The uncertainty regarding the 
final result obstructs any medium and long-term planning'. 
13. In view of its own uncertainty, but faced with industry's need for some 
certainty about the final stage, the Commission has simply calculated the 
specific component for the final stage, a figure that will however serve 
merely as a reference point. The Council is not asked to approve this figure 
so that in fact the uncertainty about the final stage will remain. 
Calculation of the relative component of the specific excise duty to 
apply during the final phase should be directed towards the objective set in 
Article 4(3) of the first directive 72/464/EEC1 , namely that the range of retail 
selling prices should reflect fairly the difference in the manufacturer's 
delivery prices. The Commission is right in saying that, with this end in 
view, the ideal way of fixing the final stage would be to measure the extent 
to which changes in the structure and level of taxation would affect the 
relationship between the retail selling price and the price exclusive of tax. 
However, since it is clearly impossible to predict how producers and govern-
ments will react to changes in the structure of taxation, this ideal approach 
cannot be used. 
The Commission has therefore chosen to assume that the tax burden on 
cigarettes in the most popular price category will not change. It then 
calculates that the ratio beb~een the specific component of the excise duty 
and the total tax burden to apply at the final stage should be 20%. As 
l OJ No. L 303, 31.12.1972 
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mentioned above, this figure can serve only as a reference point and there 
is no certainty whatsoever that it would in fact apply at the final stage. 
14. However, opinions differ as regards the final objective. The purpose 
of harmonization must be to arrive at a taxation structure which is as 
netural as possible from the point of view of competition. Every effort 
must be made to avoid limiting or distorting competition. It was for this 
reason that in the preparatory work for the second period of harmonization 
the Economic and Social Committee asked whether a fixed relationship 
between the specific and the proportional tax components was really the 
most neutral of solutions from the point of view of competition. The 
commission was asked to conduct a thorough inquiry into whether it would 
not be better to base harmonization on a different method. However, the 
Commission never carried out the inquiry on the grounds that the principle 
of the harmonization process was laid down in paragraph 4 of the Council 
Directive 72/464/EEC which did not provide for any alternative. 
Previously the Economic and Social committee had suggested that instead 
of establishing a fixed relationship between the specific and proportional 
components of taxation on the extent to which proportiona.l taxation 
increased retail selling prices should be harmonized. This proposal implies 
applying the same fiscal multiplier1 but does not rule out differing rates 
of taxation. Following the results of the third harmonization period, this 
proposal was reiterated by tobacco manufacturers' organizations. In this 
connection, the explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission's proposal 
quotes a proportional tax rate of 50% or less of the retail selling price 
which implies a low multiplier (less than 2). EXperience has shown that a 
low multiplier permitshealthyprice competition. This is the yardstick 
against which the tax system will ultimately have to be measured. 
In view of the advantages which it clearly offers, a system which 
lays down the rate by which proportional taxation may increase retail selling 
prices is worth serious consideration. The Commission should thoroughly 
investigate this alternative. The basic principle laid down in Article 4 of 
the Directive 72/464/EEC does not preclude such an inquiry. If the inquiry 
should confirm that a different pr.inciple is in fact more suitable from the 
point of view of competition, then the Commission shouHdraw up appropriate 
proposals. 
1 Relationship between the difference in ~he retail price of two brands of 
cigarettes and the difference in prices exclusive of tax. 
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15. What is the situation as regards the proposal that in the third stage 
of harmonization the margin of fluctuation of the specific components 
should be narrowed? On closer inspection it appear!! that thi!! third 
stage of harmonization will not predetermine what the final structure 
will be. Calculations have revealed that the third stage will lead to a 
convergence of various national taxation structures towards a taxation 
structure where the specific component will constitute approximately 20% 
of total taxation and where proportional taxation will account for 50% 
of retail selling prices. The proposed third stage will mean a step 
towards harmonization even if only a modest one. In view of the fact 
that this third stage still leaves all the options open as regards the 
final stage, the committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is able to 
lend its support to the proposal for this stage. 
16. Article 9 of the first Directive 72/464/EEC of 19 December 1972 and 
Article 10 of the Second Directive granted Member States the right to exclude 
customs duties from the basis of calculation of the proportional excise duty 
on cigarettes. The Commission is now suggesting that this derogation be 
abolished and that customs duties on imports be taken fully into account 
when fixing the basis of assessment on which the ad valorem excise duty is 
charged. Since the customs duty on cigarettes specified in the Common 
CUstomsTariff is 90% of the value for customs purposes, and with domestic 
taxes accounting for between 61% and 88% of the retail selling price, 
the incidence of the customs duties will amount to 150% or more of the 
value for customs purposes. 
Before the committee can appreciate the effect of this measure, it will 
need to be informed of the use made at present of the derogation, the volume 
of imports, the breakdown of imports according to country of origin, price 
category and quality, the type of consumer of these foreign cigarettes, etc. 
17. Article 10 of the first directive also gave Member States the right to 
levy on cigarettes a minimum exc~se duty the amount of which might not be 
higher than 90% of the aggregate amount of the proportional excise duty and 
the specific excise duty levied on the cigarettes in the most popular price 
category. Five Member States have exercised this right. 
The reason for this minimum limit is the multiplier effect of a high ad 
valorem excise duty. Since excise duty rates are high, small differences in 
factory prices will produce large differences in retail selling prices where 
the ad valorem component p:edominates. This means that there is a danger, in 
countries with a proportionately high ad valorem excise duty, that opening 
up the market will lead to its being overrun by cigarettes in the lower price 
category. This distortion of the market can be prevented by placing a minimum 
limit on excise duties. As the specific component increases as a result of 
harmonization, this multiplier effect will become less. The Camnission there-
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fore proposes that during the next stage Qf harmonization this minimum should 
be no greater than 80% of the total e~ise duty on cigarettes of the most 
popular price category. The suggested ceiling should create no difficulties 
--
if the proportion of the specific e~ise duty in the total tax burden is set 
at 10%. At the present time only Belgium and Germany have a ceiling of 
approximately 90%. 
The proposed lowering of the ceiling for the minimum excise duty will 
make a wider range of prices possible and increase opportunities for com-
petition without it being fixed so low as to·distQrb certain national markets 
for cigarettes. 
18. The first Council directive of 19 Decemb.er 1972 (72/464/EEC) held out 
the prospect of harmonization, in the final stage, of the rules governing 
collection. The need to harmoni<:e -the method of collecting excise duty as 
well as its structure is clear. Now Article 2 provides for the Council to 
adopt common rules governing collection of the excise duty before 31 December 
1983. These rules would enter into force from 1 January 1985. The Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs considers it extremely important that the 
method of collection of excise duty should be harmonized as soon as possi. ble 
since it is an essential element of harmonization. The Commission is there-
fore urged to submit the necessary proposals as early as possible. 
19. An estimate of the financial implications of the present proposal is set 
out in the financial record. The forecasts are based on various hypotheses 
concerning prices (retail and producer prices), tax yield, development of the 
market structure etc. Using these static hypotheses which take no account of 
general shifts in the tobacco market, the Commission has made an estimate of 
the effect on expenditure, i.e. the additional intervention purchases and the 
additional refunds for exports of raw tobacco which together will cost 
2.94 million EUA. The extra customs duty revenue accruing from increased 
imports of raw tobacco into the Community is estimated at 0.4 million EUA. 
Although the Commission's analysis pertains exclusively to the situation in 
Italy and France, these countries do provide 95% of the Community's raw 
tobacco production. A change in intra-Community patterns of trade following 
harmonization is, however, not to be excluded and this would also have 
financial consequences which the Commission has completely ignored. This 
evaluation of the financial consequences, based on static hypotheses, is 
thus incomplete and this point is stressed in the opinion of the Committee on 
Budgets. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS 
Draftsman : Mr NOTENBOOM 
on 25 September 1980 the Committee on Budgets appointed 
Mr Notenboom draftsman. 
It considered the draft op1n1on at its meeting of 10 October 1980 
and adopted it by 14 votes to 6 with 1 abstention. 
Present: Mr Lange, chairman; Mr Notenboom, vice-chairman and 
draftsman; Mr Spinelli, vice-chairman; Mr ~donnino, Mr d'Ange1osante 
(deputizing for Mr Gouthier) Mr Ansquer, Mr Arndt, Mr Baillot, Mr Barbi, 
Mrs Boserup, Mr Colla, Mr Dankert, Mr Fich, Mr Forth, Mrs Hoff, 
Mr Howell, Mr R. Jackson, Mr Langes, Mr Nielsen (deputizing for Mr Nord), 
Mr Ryan, Mrs Scrivener, Mr J.M. Taylor and Mr Tuckman. 
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1. This proposal for a Council directive concerns the third stage in the 
harmonization of the structure of excise duty on cigarettes. Excise duty 
on cigarettes is made up of two components: a specific component and a 
proportional component. Under the basic Council directive No. 72/464/EEC 
the amount of the specific excise duty and the rate of the proportional 
excise duty must be the same for all cigarettes. The ratio between the two 
components is net prescribed. This ratio still differs considerably from 
Member State to Member State and is the subject of the harmonization process 
which must lead to the retail selling prices reflecting fairly the 
manufacturers' selling prices. This can only be the case when the proportional 
component is large enough. 
2. In the first stage of harmonization from 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1975 -
subsequently extended until 30 June 1978 - the specific component of the 
excise duty had, in each Member State to be within the range 5-75%. In the 
second stage from l July 1978 to 31 December 1980 the difference had to be 
reduced to between 5% and 55% of the total tax (excise duty + VAT) on 
cigarettes in the most popular price category. The third stage from 
1 January 1981 to 31 December 1986 should reduce the difference to between 
10% and 35%. However there will be a transitional period: until 31 December 
1982 5% to 55% and until 31 December 1984 7.5% to 42.5%. The Commission 
has suggested 20% as possibly the ultimate ideal ratio. 
3. The length of the stages and the extent of the acknowledged differences 
point to the great divergence in the markets. This problem and also matters 
such as the criterion for harmonization (ratio of the specific to the 
proportional component instead of, for example, the tariff itself), the 
possibility of excluding customs duties from the basis for calculating the 
proportional element of excise duty, fixing the minimum excise duty and 
harmonization of the method of levying excise duty come within the terms of 
reference of the committee responsible and are therefore not covered here. 
4. The Committee on Budgets feels bound to point out, however, that the 
Commission's calculations presuppose an extremely static situation. When 
calculating the effect of tax structures on retail prices a constant amount 
of tax for cigarettes in the most popular price category is assumed. In 
the evaluation of the consequences of the proposed directive on the French 
market it is also assumed that tax revenue must remain constant and that 
therefore the retail price of the most popular cigarette will increase by 
2%. For the Italian market the assumption is extended to cover a static 
producer and retail price. 
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5. The financial implications are calculated only on the basis of the 
developments envisaged for the French and Italian market. These in fact 
account for almost 95% of tobacco produced in the Community and would 
therefore occasion most intervention purchases and additional imports from 
third countries. However the possibility cannot be ruled out that 
harmonization will also affect intra-Community trade and thus reduce the 
estimates of intervention purchases for France and Italy and could also 
reduce imports from third countries. 
6. The consequences for expenditure are covered by the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section: if constant production is assumed, lower consumption of tobacco 
produced in the Community will result in: 
- additional intervention purchases: 1050 tonnes at 2,726 EUA 
per tonne = 2.86 m EUA 
- additional exports with refunds: 250 tonnes at 338.5 EUA 
per tonne= 0.08 m EUA 
}..94 m EUA 
The receipts arise from: 
- additional imports of light tobacco: 1300 tonnes at 300 EUA 
per tonne= 0.39 m EUA 
- imports of light instead of darker 
tobacco which yield less duty: 750 tonnes at (300-280) 
EUA per tonne= 0.01 m EUA 
0.40 m EUA 
However this will only occur at the end (lC\85) of this stage of harmoni:::1tion. 
In the years ahead expenditure and receipts would be lower. Linder the 
circumstances the static situation assumed as a basis for calculation seems 
strange. 
7. The tobacco market is changing. There is a trend, already noted, 
towards lighter types of tobacco. There is also increasing action by pressure 
groups and governments to reduce tobacco consumption. Such trends lie 
outside strictly fiscal considerations. However they could throw a completely 
different light on the financial consequences envisaged here. 
B. Conclusion 
The Committee on Budgets ~:elcomes the proposal for harmonization of 
taxes on the consumption of tobacco. It has serious reservations about 
the inadequate assessment of the changes in the tobacco market structure 
which would be caused by the proposal and thus the financial consequences. 
It is also regrettable that the proposal only projects the immediate and 
directly induced consequences and does not take into account general shifts 
in the tobacco market. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE 
Draftsman: Mrs Barbara CASTLE 
The Committee on Agriculture appointed Mrs Barbara Castle draftsman 
on 26 November 1980. 
It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 16/17 February 
1981 and adopted it by 9 votes to 8 with 14 abstentions. 
Present: Sir Henry Plumb, chairman, Mr Caillavet, vice-chairman, 
Mrs Castle, draftsman, Mr !\bens (deputizing for Mrs Cresson·), 
Mr Barbagli (deputizing for Mr Ligios), Miss Barbarella, Mr Clinton, 
Mr Colleselli, Mr Cronin (deputizing for Mr Davern), Mr Curry, Mr Dalsass, 
Mr De Keersmaeker (deputizing for Mr Bocklet), Mr Delatte, Mr Diana, 
Lord Douro (deputizing for Mr Battersby), Mr Fanton, Mr Gautier, Mr Hord, 
Mr Jurgens, Mr McCartin (deputizing for Mr Fruh), Mr Maffre-Baug~, 
Mr Maher, Mr Nielsen, Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Papaefstratiou, Mr Skovmand, 
Mr Sutra, Mr Tolman, Mr vernimmen, Mr Wettig and Mr Woltjer. 
17 PE 66.992/fir.. 
The Committee on Agriculture hereby submits to the Committee - on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and to the European Parliament the following 
amendments to the Motion for a Resolution: 
Delete paragraph 2. 
Add the following new paragraphs: 
2a. Believes that the saleability of cigarettes and tobacco depends as 
much on variations in taste as on differential variations in price 
and that it is therefore wrong to penalize the tastes of particular 
consumers in an effort to compel them to change to cigarettes which 
they do not find acceptable: 
12. Invites the Commission to strengthen measures to encourage Community 
tobacco producers to grow those varieties required by the Community 
market. 
Justification 
1. The Commission's proposal is the third stage of the harmonization of 
excise duty levied on cigarettes. Under council Directive 72/464/EEC of 
December 1972, which launched the first stage, harmonization is to be 
achieved by fixing the ratio between two tax components: a fixed amount 
per cigarette ('specific component') and a variable amount proportional 
to the current retail price ('ad valorem'). During the first stage ending 
on 30 June 1977, the specific component was to be brought within a bracket 
of between 5% and 75% of the total excise duty levied on cigarettes, 
excluding VAT. During the second stage, which came into effect on 
1 July 1978 and has been extended to June 1981, it must be brought within 
a bracket of between 5% and 55% including VAT. During the third stage, 
which under the terms of the proposal must be completed on 31 December 1986, 
it will have to be brought within a bracket of between 10% and 35%. 
2. Member States in the Community are divided into two main groups for tobacco 
tax purposes: those producing high quality, higher priced cigarettes for whom 
a specific tax is therefore more appropriate and those producing cheaper 
varieties who have historjcally preferred an ad valorem tax. Commission 
figures show that five Member States (the Benelux countries, France and Italy) 
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apply specific components close to the authorized minimum of ::;.~; three more 
(United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland) apply a specific component close to the 
authorized maximum of 55% while the Federal Republic of Germany has reduced its 
specific component from 51% to 40% of total tax. A process of harmonization 
designed to establish a fixed and uniform relationship between the two components 
represents a threat to the interests of each group, which explains why progress 
has been so slow. 
3. The Commission has stated that the only possible basis of harmonization 
should be 'a process of broadly equal efforts of adaptation by Member States'. 
But in fact this has not been the case. Since the first stage of harmonization 
Member States historically levying excise duty through ad valorem tax have only 
had to accept a specific tax element of 5% whereas those preferring specific 
tax have had to accept an ad valorem element of 45-5~~. In addition the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, where before accession excise duty had for a century been 
based on the weight of the leaf tobacco used in manufacturing, were compelled 
to move to specific tax under the Directive passed a fortnight before they 
joined. These developments have involved them in an effort of adjustment not 
matched anywhere in the Community. 
4. The multiplier effect of an ad valorem tax applied to high quality cigarettes 
has undesirable social and economic consequences. Not only does the tax increase 
with the price, but it also reduces when the price reduces, thus giving manu-
facturers an incentive to engage in a price cutting war. This lessens their 
ability to offer consumers wider choices of product within a given price range. 
At valorem tax also penalizes expenditure on scientific research and develop-
ment arising out of the public concern about the problem of smoking and healtl1. 
Reductions in price and quality under tl1e influence of a hiqh ad valorem tax 
could also reduce the ability of Community cigarettes to compete with higher 
quality products on the world market. Finally, the reduction of tax yield 
which follows price cutting could compel governments to intervene to check 
this loss of revenue by fixing prices, contrary to the principles of harmoniz-
ation and free competition. It is significant that countries with the highest 
ad valorem tax get the lowest tax yield because manufacturers reduce both 
quality and price in order to compete. 
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s. The Commission admits that the degree of market inter-penetration produced 
h7 harmonization has so far not been great. This is because the saleability 
of cigarettes depends more on variations in taste than in price. Also the 
existenc~ of state monopolies in France and Italy, giving their govern~ents 
complete control over prices, and the close government supervision of prices 
in the Benelux countries, has done more to distort competition than tax 
differences have done. Moreover there are large differences in the overall 
level of cigarette taxation in Member States, the level in the Member State 
with the highest taxation being six times as great as that in the Member State 
with the lowest level. It is not to be expected that Member States will be 
willing to give up the freedom to impose the levels of tax that most suit their 
social policies. 
6. The third stage of harmonization now proposed would mean a further unequal 
adjustment in tax, the countries preferring specific tax having to reduce 
this element to 35% while countries preferring ad valorem tax would merely 
have to move from 5% specific tax to 10%. The Commission justifies this as 
an interim step towards its final goal of a 20% component of specific tax. 
Such a component, it argues, represents the arithmetic mean of the price 
changes which would result from all Member States adopting the two extremes 
of specific tax element fixed for the second stage, 5% to 55%, and therefore 
represents a 'broadly equal effort of adaptation' by Member States in the two 
groups. Not only does this method of calculation make no attempt to determine 
the optimum tax structure for the Community, but it has been challenged as 
fallacious. For example, it assumes that tax changes do not affect the level 
of tax exclusive prices, whereas a high ad valorem tax can be shown to have 
such an effect. 
1, A more important criticism lies in the fact that account is not taken of 
the major implications of their proposal upon the market. A very high 
ad valorem element amplifies any cut or increase in prices to an extreme 
degree; the government in fact through loss of revenue aubsidizes such 
price cuts. This exaggerated impact on prices (or the multiplier effect) 
inevitably leads to destabilization of the market and a reaction by national 
treasuries unhappy at loss of revenue. Wherever a high ad valorem element 
has been applied, governments have entered to apply price controls, leading 
inevitably to distortion in competition and in direct contradiction to 
basic concepts underlying the Treaty. 
8. Moreover, Community cigarette producers should be able to compete in 
the world market, and any system, such as a high ad valorem tax, which 
mitigates against the production of the high quality cigarettes is not to 
be welcomed. 
20 PE 66.992/fin. 
9. During the second stage of harmonization the Economic and Social committee 
in Brussels proposed an alternative method of harmonization based on the extent 
to which proportional taxation increased retail selling prices and asked for 
an inquiry but the Commission rejected this as incompatible with 
Directive 72/464/EEC. What the Commission ignores, however, is that its own 
proposal for increasing the ad valorem"element to 65% and eventually 80% is 
incompatible with Article 3 of the Treaty which calls for the elimination of 
distortions of competition. Such figures would produce multipliers exceeding 
two and eventually an average multiplier of three, which would severely distort 
competition. Most consumer products bear a multiplier as a result of the ad 
valorem elements of VAT and distributive margins, but in most cases it is 
around 1.5 or less. The Commission itself has criticized levels of indirect 
taxation on articles of mass consumption which p:::oduce a multiplier of two 
and has donE;, so on the grounds that high multipliers distort, competition. 
It is therefore ironic that it should itself be proposing high multipliers 
in the case of tobacco. If harmonization is to be achieved on the basis of 
a ratio between the two components, the multiplier effect should not exceed 
1. 7, which gives a specific component of around the present level of 50"/o. 
A ratio of 50/50 specific and ad valorem would therefore be the one which 
accords most closely with the basic aim of the Community, ensuring that 
competition is not distorted, set out in Article 3. 
10. A move from the present specific component of 5% to 50"/o would cause 
grave difficulties for certain Member States. If it were to be proceeded 
with, therefore, a long period of derogation would be required to enable 
the producers of lower priced tobacco, notably in France and Italy, to adjust 
to the new situation. At present, despite CAP expenditure on support for 
tobacco growers running at 210 million units of account in 1978, the L~ommunity 
still produces very little tobacco in the grades and varieties needed in the 
north European markets and there is surplus production of some varieties, 
such as Oriental tobacco, which will be exacerbated following the accession 
of Greece, which is a large producer of Oriental. These difficulties should 
be recognized by changes in the type of CAP support so as to encourage 
farmers to move towards the production of the qualities and varieties the 
market needs. The introduction of a common market organization for tobacco 
in 1970 was intended to enable tobacco tax harmonization to be dealt with on 
its own merits and it would be quite wrong for the failure of the CAP system 
of support to encourage the growth of the right types of tobacco to be used 
as a reason for harmonizing tax on a basis which protects the producer of 
lower grades and penalizes the consumer of higher quality imported varieties. 
These consumers already carry the burden of an import levy on the tobaccos 
which have to be imported because they are not grown in the Community, whereas 
consumers of lower quality varieties made of indigenous tobacco are spared 
such a levy. The demand now being pressed by the growers for the imposition 
21 PE 66.992/fin. 
of a supplementary Community excise duty on the quantity of imported tobacco 
in cigarettes should be resisted as not only would this discriminate against 
developing countries (from whom most of the Flue cured Virginia Type tobacco 
used in certain Member States comes), but against the consumers who prefer 
the varieties which the Community itself does ~.grow. 
11. Should a S0/50 ratio between specific and ad valorem ~ax not prove 
acceptable, the Commission should be asked to conduct an inquiry into the 
whole system of harmonization through a fixed ratio with a view to finding 
alternative ways of equalising competition. 
12. It should be noted that the views expressed above 
draftsman and are only partly shared by the committee 
are those of the 
on Agriculture as 
following points, a whole. It did not agree with the drafts~an on the 
which she had included in her draft opinion: • 
- Notes that the stages of harmonization which have so far taken place have 
not significantly increased the inter-penetration of markets, and that 
one of the qreatest obst~cles to freer competition in tobacco prl~ncts 
among Member States lies in the continuing existence of state tobacco 
marketing monopolies contrary to the objectives of the Treaty of Rome: 
-Believes that the establishment of a fixed re~tionship between the 
specific and proportional elements in tobacco tax is not the most 
effective way of ensuring fairer competition in the Community, but 
believes, if harmonization on this basis is to be pursued, that an 
equitable division between ad valorem and specific tax would be close 
to a 50-50 division so as to reconcile the interests of the two major 
groups of manufacturers in the Community: 
Requests the Commission therefore to revise its proposal so as to allow 
for a more comprehensive approach to the problem of facilitating trade 
in the cigarette sector, and to suspend any further proposals for tax 
harmonization until other barriers to the inter-penetration of markets, 
notably the existence of state tobacco monopolies, have been removed.' 
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